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Environmental Law

‘American Electric Power’ Leaves Open
Many Questions for Climate Litigation

O

n June 20, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court
issued its much-anticipated decision in
American Electric Power v. Connecticut,1
the second climate change case to be
decided by that Court and the first to
concern common law claims. The decision resolves
a few issues but leaves many others open.
By way of background, in 2004, at a time when
environmentalists were frustrated at the refusal of
Congress and President George W. Bush to regulate
greenhouse gases (GHGs), two suits were brought
against six electric power companies that run
fossil fuel plants in a total of 20 states. One suit
was brought by eight states and New York City;
the other suit was brought by three land trusts.
The plaintiffs in both cases claimed that the GHGs
from the power plants constitute a common law
nuisance, and they asked the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York to issue an
injunction requiring the plants to reduce their
emissions.
In 2005, Judge Loretta A. Preska dismissed
the cases on the grounds that they raise nonjusticiable political questions.2 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard oral
argument in June 2006. As the third anniversary
of that argument passed, the Second Circuit’s
long delay in deciding became one of the great
mysteries in climate change law. Meanwhile, the
Supreme Court issued the landmark decision in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,3
which held that states have standing to challenge
the refusal by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to regulate GHGs, that GHGs are “air
pollutants” within the meaning of the Clean Air Act,
and that EPA has the authority to regulate them.
Later, one of the three members of the panel that
heard the arguments in the AEP case was elevated
to the Supreme Court—Judge Sonia Sotomayor.
Finally, in September 2009, the two remaining
members of the panel issued the decision4—
Judge Joseph McLaughlin, an appointee of the
first President George H.W. Bush, and Judge Peter
W. Hall, appointed by the second President Bush.
The Second Circuit decision was a major win for
the plaintiffs. First, the panel found that the case
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was perfectly justiciable and did not raise political
questions as that concept has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court. Second, though it did not
need to, the panel found not only that the states
had standing to sue—which might have been
foreshadowed by the Massachusetts decision—
but also that the private land trusts had standing
because they alleged that their property was being
harmed by climate change. This would potentially
open the courthouse doors to broad classes of
people and entities beyond states. Third, the panel
found that the federal common law of nuisance
applied, and that it had not been displaced by
the Clean Air Act and Environmental Protection
Agency actions under that statute. Thus, the
Second Circuit remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings.

The decision reversed the Second Circuit
and found that the federal common law
nuisance claims could not proceed.
Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. It heard
argument on April 19. On June 20 the justices
issued their decision. Eight justices participated;
Justice Sotomayor was recused. The decision
was unanimous, 8-0, and was written by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The decision reversed the
Second Circuit and found that the federal common
law nuisance claims could not proceed. The sole
reason was that the Clean Air Act, as interpreted in
Massachusetts, gave EPA the authority to regulate
greenhouse gases, and EPA was exercising that
authority. This displaced the federal common
law of nuisance. The Court declared, “Congress
delegated to EPA the decision whether and how
to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power
plants; the delegation is what displaces federal
common law.” Thus, it is not for the federal courts
to issue their own rules.

Expert Analysis

This may be the most intriguing paragraph in
the opinion: “The petitioners contend that the
federal courts lack authority to adjudicate this
case. Four members of the Court would hold that
at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing
under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to
challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions; and further, that no other threshold
obstacle bars review. Four members of the court,
adhering to a dissenting opinion in Massachusetts,
or regarding that decision as distinguishable,
would hold that none of the plaintiffs have Article
III standing. We therefore affirm, by an equally
divided Court, the Second Circuit’s exercise of
jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.”5
Though unnamed in the opinion, clearly the
four justices who find standing, and no other
obstacles to review, are Justices Ginsburg, Stephen
Breyer, Elena Kagan and Anthony Kennedy. The
four who disagree are Chief Justice John Roberts
and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and
Samuel Alito. The Ginsburg group thus apparently
rejects the political question defense as well as
the standing argument.
Should another case come up on which Justice
Sotomayor is not recused, there might be a 5-4
majority to allow climate change nuisance
litigation, but for the Clean Air Act displacement.
So this aspect of the Supreme Court decision did
not set precedent in the technical sense, but it may
give an indication of how the Supreme Court as
presently constituted would rule in another case
where states sued on public nuisance grounds
about GHGs, but where displacement was not
operating.
On the other hand, the paragraph quoted
above (when considered in conjunction with
Massachusetts) may hint that Justice Kennedy
believes that only states would have standing.
Thus, there might be a 5-4 majority against any
kinds of GHG nuisance claims (and maybe other
kinds of GHG claims) by non-states.

State Claims Left Unresolved
The Court explicitly did not decide whether
the Clean Air Act preempts state public nuisance
litigation over GHGs. The Court remanded the case
for consideration of this issue. The defendants
would certainly argue that the Clean Air Act
displaces state common law nuisance claims as
well. The plaintiffs would no doubt counter that
the Clean Air Act has provisions that explicitly
say that common law claims are not preempted,
at least by certain parts of the Clean Air Act.6
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In the next volley, the defendants would quote
Justice Ginsburg’s statement in AEP that “judges
lack the scientific, economic, and technological
resources an agency can utilize in coping with
issues of this order…Judges may not commission
scientific studies or convene groups of experts for
advice, or issue rules under notice-and-comment
procedures.”7 Where this ball stops, only time
can tell.
It is also possible that plaintiffs will forum
shop—they will look for the federal district or
circuit, or state court system, where they are
most likely to prevail in their non-preemption
argument.
Pressing state common law nuisance claims
will raise several additional complications. One
of them is which state’s law will apply. If relief
is sought against a particular facility, it might
well be the law of the state where the facility is
located. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit recently considered common law nuisance
claims against facilities in several states in a case
concerning conventional air pollutants, not GHGs.8
The court found that the laws of the states where
the plants were located specifically allowed the
activities—in other words, the facilities were
operating pursuant to and in compliance with
state permits—and therefore nuisance actions
were precluded. If the same doctrine applied
to the defendants’ facilities in a new case about
GHGs, the plaintiffs would face a tough burden
in proving that the plants were not operating in
accordance with state law.
Another complication with state common law
nuisance claims is that some states would act
to bar such claims. On June 17, 2011, Governor
Rick Perry of Texas signed a bill providing
that companies sued for nuisance or trespass
for GHG emissions would have an affirmative
defense if those companies were in substantial
compliance with their environmental permits.9
Since the AEP opinion was based entirely on
displacement by congressional designation of
EPA as the decision-maker on GHG regulation, if
Congress takes away EPA’s authority to regulate
GHGs but does not explicitly bar federal common
law nuisance claims, these cases will come back.
Thus, this interestingly changes the political
dynamic a bit—success by opponents of GHG
regulation in their efforts to take away EPA’s
authority could swiftly bring back the common
law claims, unless they are also able to muster
enough votes to go further and explicitly preempt
the federal and state common law claims.

Damages vs. Injunctive Relief
Another question left open is whether the
Supreme Court’s decision bars all federal common
law nuisance claims, or only those like AEP that
sought injunctive relief. This particular question
may be litigated very soon, perhaps in two different
cases—the two other public nuisance cases for
GHGs that are currently pending. One of them
is Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil. That case
was dismissed by the district court and is now on
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.10 The case was put on hold pending the
decision in AEP. Now that the case is off hold, the
plaintiffs are arguing that AEP affects only suits
for injunctive relief, not suits for money damages,
like Kivalina.

The other case is Comer v. Murphy Oil, a suit
brought by Mississippi landowners saying that
Hurricane Katrina was made more intense as a
result of climate change. That suit was dismissed
by the district court; reversed by the Fifth Circuit;
and then undone through a bizarre procedural
sequence in which the court granted en banc
review and vacated the panel decision, and then
lost a quorum for en banc review but left the panel
decision vacated.11 On May 27, 2011, the plaintiffs
in Comer re-filed the case. It, too, is seeking money
damages, not an injunction. (The author’s firm
represents a defendant in the Kivalina and Comer
cases.)
The complaints in both Kivalina and Comer
also raised the claim that some of the defendant
companies have aggressively misrepresented and
concealed scientific information about climate
change, and alleged that this amounted to an
actionable civil conspiracy. This clam was not
raised in AEP, and it was not decided in either
Kivalina or Comer (or any other U.S. case). Thus,
it is likely to be raised again.

Since the ‘AEP’ opinion was based
entirely on displacement by
congressional designation of EPA as the
decision-maker on GHG regulation, if
Congress takes away EPA’s authority to
regulate GHGs but does not explicitly
bar federal common law nuisance
claims, these cases will come back.
None of these cases has come close to the
merits. There has been no discovery in any of
them, or litigation of such difficult issues as
how a district court would determine what is a
reasonable level of GHG emissions from a myriad
of industrial facilities, or (in the cases seeking
money damages) what defendants would be liable,
what plaintiffs would be entitled to awards, what
defendants would have to pay what share of the
award, and what plaintiffs would enjoy what
share of the award. Among the other issues that
would have to be addressed are extraterritorial
jurisdiction over foreign entities, whether there
are limits to how many third-party defendants
can be brought in, the impossibility of attributing
particular injuries to particular defendants, and
the effect of the fact that most of the relevant
emitting facilities were presumably operating
in accordance with their governmentally issued
emissions permits.
Everything else aside, AEP appears to be a
reaffirmation of EPA authority. That is shown by
two things. First, the language of the decision
itself is quite strong on EPA’s power under the
Clean Air Act. For example, the Court stated, “It
is altogether fitting that Congress designated
an expert agency, here, EPA, as best suited to
serve as primary regulator of greenhouse gas
emissions.”12 Second, Justices Alito and Thomas
wrote a concurring decision saying the opinion
assumed that Massachusetts governed and could
not be distinguished; they did not necessarily
agree with it, but no party had raised that issue.

But, perhaps significantly, Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Scalia did not join in that concurrence.
Therefore, it seems that there may now be a 7-2
majority in favor of keeping Massachusetts and its
finding that EPA has strong authority to regulate
GHGs under the Clean Air Act. This, in turn, may
have somewhat strengthened EPA’s hand in the
multiple litigations brought by various industries
and states that are resisting GHG regulation.
These cases are now pending in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia and are
based on various procedural arguments and on
alleged inconsistencies between some of EPA’s
rules and the text of the Clean Air Act.13
Thus we have a very interesting situation.
All four of the district courts that have ruled
in common law nuisance cases on GHGs—AEP,
Kivalina, Comer, and a case called California v.
General Motors 14—have dismissed the cases
based on political question grounds, and, in some
instances, on standing grounds. But all three of
the appellate courts that have ruled in these
cases—the Second Circuit in AEP, the Fifth Circuit
in Comer (until the panel decision was undone on
procedural grounds), and now the Supreme Court
in AEP—have found that political question and
standing are not obstacles.
These U.S. cases (plus a series of cases filed in
several different states in May 2011 on a public
trust theory) were the only cases brought
anywhere in the world using common law theories
to seek either injunctive relief or money damages
for greenhouse gas emissions. The victories by
plaintiffs in the Second Circuit in AEP and, for a
while, in the Fifth Circuit in Comer, excited proplaintiff environmental lawyers around the world,
and the Supreme Court was being watched with
keen interest. Now the Supreme Court has ruled,
but the decision is rather narrow, and it might
not have much bearing in a common law country
that has not enacted a statute like the Clean Air
Act that could be seen as displacing the common
law through its allocation of governmental power
over GHGs to an administrative agency. So the
reaction in other such countries is yet another
question left open by AEP.
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